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[So F. No. 22261.

In Bank.

Nov. 10, 1967.]

DANIEL GORHAM WHEALTON, Plaintiff and Respondent,
V. HAZEL LORRAINE WHEALTON, Defendant and
Appellant.
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[1] Process-Service by Publication.-In an action for annulment
of marriage, a defendant residing outside the state could be
served by publication (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412, 413), which wa.'J
complete upon making personal service outside the state or at
the expiration of the time prescribed' by the order of publication, whichever first occurred (Code Civ. Proc., § 413).
[2a,2b] Judgments-Judgments by Defa.ult-Time for Entry.-In
an action for annulment of marriage, entry of default and a
default judgment entered only 16 days after the earliest date
on which service by pUblication could be deemed completed
were void, where a defendant served by publication had 30
days after service was complete to appear and answer (Code
Civ. Proc., § 407) and would not be in default until the ~xpira
tion of that time.
[S] Process-Service by Publication-Personal Service Without
State.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 413, providing that when
publication of summons is ordered, personal service of a copy
of the summons and complaint out of the state is equivalent to
publication and deposit in the post office, receipt of a mailed
summons by defendant out of the state is not personal service
thereof, requirements of a personal service being strictly
construed, and a mere showing that a party had notice in fact
being insufficient to establisb such service.
[4] Marriage-Annulment.-An annulment of marriage differ's
conceptually from a divorce in that a divorce terminates a

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d Rev., Divorce, Separation and Annulment,
§ 330; Am.Jur., Marriage (1st ed § 75).
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Process, Notices, and Papers, § 76; Am. Jur.,
Process (1st ed § 59).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Process, § 27; [2] Judgments, § 51;
[3] Process, §51; [4,5,7,8] Marriage, §34; [6] Marriage, §§ 34,
44; [9] Military, § 2.8(3).
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legal status, whereas an annulment establishes that a marital
status never existed.
[6] Id.-Annulment-Jurisdiction.-In an action for annulment of
marriage, due process concepts of fairness to defendant do not
permit plaintiff to choose a forum inconvenient to defendant
absent personal jurisdiction over defendant, and, although a
rule that requires a party who is in California and who had
been fraudulently induced into a marriage to travel to an
inconvenient forum to obtain legal recognition of the nullity
of that status works a hardship on that party, such a rule is
essential to preclude a transient plaintiff from choosing a
forum that would make defense difficult or impossible simply
because of physical distance.
[6] Id.-Annulment-Jurisdiction: Default Judgment.-In an action for annulment of marriage, the court was without jurisdiction to enter a default judgment where the marriage ceremony took place elsewhere, defendant lived elsewhere, the
matrimonial domicile was elsewhere, witnesses were likely to
be located elsewhere, and, although domicile of a plaintiff
would afford jurisdiction to award an ex parte annulment,
plaintiff did not plead or prove that he was a domiciliary of
California when the default judgment was entered.
[7] Id.-Annulment-Jurisdiction.-The rule that domicile of at
least one of the parties is a prerequisite to a: valid divorce does
not apply to annulment actions, however valid the rationale for
such prerequisite may be in divorce actions; in divorce actions,
the applicable substantive law changes as parties change their
domicile, but in annulment actions courts uniformly apply the
law of the state in which the marriage was contracted, and
the interests of the state of celebration of the marriage or the
, state of domicile of either party do not preclude a court of a
sister state having personal jurisdiction over both parties from
entertaining an annulment action.
[8] Id. - Annulment - Jurisdiction. - A California court having
personal jurisdiction over both parties, could entertain an annulment action where plaintiff, being in military service, was
under a special disability in terms of access to any forum
other than California, defendant was not caught inadvertently
within California, and personal jurisdiction was not exercised
on a territorial power theory but obtained over defendant
through her consent, no undue burdens being placed on her by
the trial of the action in California.
[9] !4ilitary-Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act-Motion to Stay
Proceedings.-In an annulment action in which plaintiff's request for a stay of proceedings on defendant's motion to set
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Divorce, Separation and Annulment,
§ 328 ; Am.Jur., Marriage (1st ed § 60 et seq).
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aside a default judgment was based on the Soldiers' and Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940, plaintiff's prosecution of the
case at such stage was not materially affected by his military
service so as to justify a stay where the grounds urged for
setting aside the default judgment were that it was premature
and that the California court was without jurisdiction; where
plaintiff's military service in no way interfered with his ability
to defend the judgment; where the facts were not in dispute
and were a matter of first-hand knowledge to his attorney as
well as to plaintiff; and where the disputed question was one of
law that plaintiff's attorney could take charge of without
plaintiff's presence.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Alvin E. Weinberger,
Judge. Reversed.
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Action.to annul a marriage. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
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John A. Bohn, Jr., for Defendant and Appellant.
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John E. Anderton and Helen B. Larson for Plaintiff and
Respondent .
I

Wagener, Lynch, Curran & Minney and H. Ward Dawson
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a default judgment annulling her marriage to plaintiff on the ground of
fraud.
Plaintiff, a petty officer on active duty with the United
States Navy, married defendant at Bel Air, Maryland, on
June 15, 1964. Thereafter his military duties took him from
place to place on the east coast until he was assigned to the
U.S.S. Repose at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard. He arrived in California on JUly 14, 1965. Plaintiff and defendant
lived together for only six or seven weeks on the east coast.
On September 3, 1965, plaintiff filed this action for annulment of the marriage. Summons was issued and an order for
publication of summons was flIed on the same day. Publication of the summons was accomplished as prescribed by law.
Defendant received a copy of the summons by mail at her
home in Maryland on September 7, 1965. On September 11,
1965, she wrote the court that she was having difficulty obtaining legal counsel, but that she wished" it known that it is
my earnest desire and intent to contest this complaint." On
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October 11, 1965, the court entered her default, heard testimony in support of the complaint, and entered a judgment
annulling the marriage. On October 19, 1965, defendant made
a motion to set aside the default and the judgment by default
and to permit the filing of an answer and a cross-complaint.
The motion was denied on November 9,1965.
[1] Defendant contends that the default judgment must
be reversed on the grounds that it was prematurely entered
and that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter.
Since defendant resides outside the state, the summons
could be served by publication (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412,413).
"When publication is ordered, personal service of a copy of
the summons and complaint out of the State is equivalent to
pUblication and deposit in the post office. Service is complete
upon the making of such personal service or at the expiration
of the time prescribed by the order for publication, whichever
event shall first occur." (Code Civ. Proc., § 413.) [2a] Defendant had 30 days after service was complete to appear
and answer (Code Civ. Proc., § 407) and would not be in
default until the expiration of that time (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 585, subd. 3; Foster v. Vehmeyer (1901) 133 Cal. 459, 460
[65 P. 974] ; Grewell v. Henderson (1855) 5 Cal. 465, 466;
Burt v. Scra;nton (1851) 1 Cal. 416, 417.) [3] Since she
was not personally served1 the 30-day period could not begin
before September 25, 1965, the earliest date on which service
of publication could be deemed completed. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 413; Gov. Code, § 6064.) [2b] The entry of default
and the default judgment entered on October 11, 1965, only
16 days later, are therefore void.
Even if the default judgment were not premature, it would
have to be reversed, for neither the pleadings nor the evidence
establish that either party was a domiciliary of California.
The court therefore lacked jurisdiction to award an ex parte
annulment.
In ex parte divorce actions, a bona fide domicile of at least
one of the parties within the forum state is necessary for
jurisdiction. (WiUiams v. North CaroVina (1945) 325 U.S.
lReceipt of the mailed summons on September 7, 1965, was not per·
sonal service. The requirements of a personal service are strictly construed; a mere showing that a party had notice in fact is insufficient.
(Lettenmaier v. Lettenmaier (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 837, 843-844 [22
Cal.Rptr. 156]; Sternbeck v. Buck (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 829, 832 [307
P.2d 970].)
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226, 229,238 [89 L.Ed. 1577, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 157 A.L.R. 1366] ;
Orouch v. Orouch (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 243, 249 [169 P.2d 897] ;
see D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Oonflict of Laws; Sim01lS, Rosenstiel, and Bot'ax (1966) 34 U.ChLL.Rev. 26, 45;
Developments-Jurisdiction (1960) 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 966;
Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 111.) This rule reflects due. process
considerations involved in adjudicating rights of an absent
party in an inconvenient forum; it also reHects the interests
of the several states in regulating the marital status of their
domiciliaries and limits forum shopping for self-serving substantive divorce law. (See Williams v. North Oarolina, supra,
325 U.S. 226, 229-230; Orouch v. Orouch, supra, 28 Cal.2d 243,
251 ; see von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to A.djudicate :
A. Suggested Analysis (1966) 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1121, 1130;
Developments-Jurisdiction, supra, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 967968, 973-974.)
Civil Code section 128 implements this rule by requiring
that at least one of the parties to an action for divorce be a
resident of the state for a year before the action is commenced. (See also Civ. Code, § 128.1.) In this context the
statutory terms "residence" and "domicile" are synonymous. 2 (Haas v. Haas (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 615, 617 [38
Cal.Rptr~ 811]; Ungemach v. Ungemach (1943) 61 Cal.App.
2d 29, 36 [142 P.2d 99] ; see Smith, v. Smith (1955) 45 Cal.2d
235,239 [288 P.2d 497].)
In Millar v. Millar (1917) 175 Cal. 797, 807 [167 P. 394,
Ann.Cas. 1918E 184, L.R.A. 1918B 415], this court held that
the statutory residence requirement for divorce did not apply
to annulment proceedings. In that case, however, since both
parties were before the court and the marriage had been entered into in California, the court had no occasion to and did
not consider on what basis a state may constitutionally declare void a marriage of prima facie va.lidity when one of the
parties is not before the court.
2A majority of the states use length of residence as a basis for jurisdiction. Equating domicile with residence should be unnecessary to ful1ill
due process requirements. A reasonable length-of-residence test alone
would obviate the necessity for an often spurious inquiry into intent and
would demonstrate as clearly as domicile that the forum state has an
interest in adjudicating the marital status. (See D. Currie, Suitoase

Divcwoe in the Confliot of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Bcwa:£, supra,
34 U.Chi.L.Rev. 26, 64; Powell, And Repent at Leisure (1945) 58 Harv.
I...Rev. 930, 1008-1010.) Several states have statutes permitting resident
servicemen to obtain divorces without inquiry into domicile. These states
apply their own law. (See Cheatham. Griswold, Reese and Rosenberg (5th
ed. 1964) Cases On Conflict of Laws 855-856; Leflar, Conflict 0/ Law8
and FMnilll Law (1960) 14 Ark.L.Rev. 47, 49·50.)
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Ex parte divorces are a striking exception to the rule that a
court must have personal jurisdiction over a party before it
may adjudicate his substantial rights. (See von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
supra, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1121, 1129-1130.) The legal fiction that
explains the exception by regarding the marital status as a res
present at the permanent home of either of the spouses provides doctrinal consistency with other rules governing jurisdiction over things, but the appellation" in rem" is unnecessary to support the conclusion that jurisdiction is properly
assumed. s (Williams v. North Carolina (1945) 325 U.S. 226,
232 [89 L.Ed. 1577, 65 8.Ct. 1092, 157 A.L.R. 1366].)Williams does hold, however, that due process requires something
more than mere presence of a party within a jurisdiction
before that party can invoke the legal process of the forum to
force an absent spouse to defend her marital status in an
inconvenient forum and to subvert the policies of other interested jurisdictions in preserving marriages. When the
forum state is also thc domicile of one of the parties, however,
its interest and that of its domiciliary justify subordinating
the conflicting interests of the absent spouse and of any other
interested jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction to grant annulments has followed an analogous, but somewhat divergent course. [4] An annulment
differs conceptually from a divorce in that a divorce terminates a legal status, whereas an annulment establishes that a
marital status never existed. The absence of a valid marriage
precluded reliance on the divorce cases in formulating a
theory of ex parte jurisdiction in annulment, for no res or
status could be found within the state. (See Comment (1927)
16 Cal.L.Rev. 38.) The courts, however, did not let jurisdictional concepts of in personam and in rem dictate results in
annulment actions.· They recognized a state's interest in providing a forum for some annulment actions even though the
court lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the parties.
(Buzzi v. Buzzi (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 823 [205 P.2d 1125] ;
Bing Gee v. Chan La-i ¥ung Gee (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 877
[202 P.2d 360]; Comment, Jurisdiction to Annul (1953) 6
3Terms such as in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam, seldom solve
jurisdictional problems and are often a misleading shorthand for the
result. Such terms in statutes, however, may be invoked in their traditional meanings to expand or contract jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Code Civ.
Proc., § 417; Traynor, Is This Oonflict Really Necessary! (1959) 37
Tex.L.Rev. 657, 662-663; Atkinson v. Superior Oourt (1957) 49 CaI.2d
338, 344-346 [316 P.2d 960].)

662

,

,j
!
:1

i

WHEALTON V. WHEALTON

[67 C.2d

Stan.L.Rev. 153.) The crucial question, then, is whether there
are sufficient factors to justify the court's exercising ex parte
annulment jurisdiction. 4 Although we write on a slate free of
legislative directives regarding annulment jurisdiction (Millar v. MiUar, supra, 175 Cal. 797), we are bound by constitutiona I limitations.
We need not dwell on a resolution of any conflict between
the interests of California and Maryland. [5] The primary
issue under the facts of this case is whether due process concepts of fairness to defendant permit plaintiff to choose a
forum inconvenient to her absent personal jurisdiction over
her. Although a rule that requires a party who is in California and who had been fraudulently induced intO a marriage to travel to an inconvenient forum to obtain legal recognition of the nullity of that status works a hardship on that
party, such a rule is essential to preclude a transient plaintiff
from choosing a forum that would make defense difficult or
impossible simply because of physical distance. We find no
factor here that would justify an exception to the general rule
requiring personal jurisdiction and thereby shift the burden
of inconvenience to defendant. [6] The marriage ceremony
took place elsewhere, defendant lives elsewhere, the matrimonial domicile was elsewhere, and witnesses are likely to be
located elsewhere. Although domicile of a plaintiff here would
afford jurisdiction to award an ex parte annulment,5 plaintiff
in this case did not plead or prove that he was a domiciliary
of California when the default judgment was entered. The
court was therefore without jurisdiction to enter the default
judgment.
Since the entry of the judgment, however, defendant has
appeared in the action. We must therefore determine for
purposes of proceedings on retrial whether the court may
award an annulment when both parties are before it, even
though neither is a domiciliary of the state.
4See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the COfI,jlict of Laws: Simons,
Rosenstiel and Borax, supra, 34 U.ChLL.Rev. 26, 39-40; De1JelopfM'nt8Jurisdiction, supra, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 975·976.
5Buzzi v. Buzzi, supra, 91 Cal.App.2il 823; Bing Gee v. Chan Lai Yung
Gee, supra, 89 Cal.App.2d 877, 883; Comment, JurisdictiOfl, to .Annul,
supra, 6 Stan.L.Rev. 153, 155-159; cf. Williams v. North Carolina, supra,

,I

325 U.S. 226. It is true that" instant" domicile carries a danger of
fraud on the court of a higher magnituile than does a year's residence
requirement, which weighs the objective fact of presence more heavily
than n declared intent. The bona fides of the intent to make permanent a
California residence can be attacked, however, to provide relief against
those who would abuse t]le court's jurisdiction. (Crouch v. CT01UJh (1946)
28 Ca1.2d 243,249 [169 P.2d 897] ; cf. Civ. Code, § 150.2.)
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The primary basis for jurisdiction to resolve disputes between parties is their presence before the court. Plaintiff initiated this action in the only jurisdiction practically available to him because of his military service. Although defendant was not within the jurisdiction of the court when the
default was erroneously entered, she voluntarily appeared
while the action was before the court. Her appearance was not
limited to challenging the jurisdiction of the court, but included. a request for relief on the merits by way of an answer
and cross-complaint for separate maintenance. (Judson v.
Superior Court (1942) 21 Ca1.2d 11, 13 [129 P.2d 361] ; Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 189 [222 P.
15] ; Owese v. Justice's Court (1909) 156 Cal. 82, 88 [103 P.
317].)
Since both parties are properly before the court, we confront the questions whether we may treat the action as a
transitory cause (see Westerman v. Westerman (1926) 121
Kan.501 [247 P. 863] ; Avakian v. Avakian (1905, N.J. Ct. of
Chancery) 69 N.J.Eq. 89, 99 [60 A. 521, 525], affd. 69 N.J.Eq.
834 [66 A. 1133] ; Storke, A,nnulment in the Conflict of Laws
(1959) 43 Minn.L.Rev. 849, 852) and whether the interest
of another state compels us to refuse to hear this cause.
The rule that domicile is a prerequisite to a valid divorce,
even when the parties are before the court, may be justified by
the superior interests of the domiciliary jurisdiction. Such
jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the status of its
domiciliaries and the application of its own law in preserving
or terminating marriages in accord with its social policies.
(See Development-Jurisdiction, supra, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909,
975-976.) When both parties to a divorce action are before the
court, however, it is questionable whether domicile is an indispensable prerequisite for jurisdiction. If the moving party'9 mobility is greatly restricted, for instance, access to a
domiciliary forum may be practically unavailable. (Ibid; D.
Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, \
Rosenstiel and Borax, supra, 34 U.Ohi.L.Rev. 26, 48.) Moreover, when parties secure a divorce without the prerequisite
domicile in the forum state, it may not be attacked at a later
date by either of them. (Sutton v. Leib (1952) 342 U.S. 402
[96 L.Ed. 448, 72 8.0t. 398] ; Cook v. Cook (1951) 342 U.S. 126
[96 L.Ed. 146, 72 8.0t. 157] ; Johnson v. Muelberger (1951)
340 U.S. 581 [95 L.Ed. 552, 71 8.0t. 474] ; Coe v. Coe (1948)
334 U.S. 378 [92 L.Ed. 1451, 68 8.0t. 1094, 1097] ; Sherrer v.
Sherrer (1948) 334 U.S. 343 [92 L.Ed. 1429, 68 8.Ct. 1087, 1

664

i i

,

WHEALTON V. WHEALTON

[67 C.2d

A.L.R.2d 1355].) Hence, the prerequisite of domicile may be
casily avoided at the trial by parties wishing to invoke the
jurisdiction of a court, with little fear in most instances that
the judgment will be any less effective than if a valid domicile
in f.act existed. (See Leflar, Conflict of Laws and Farwily Law
(1960) 14 Ark.L.Rev. 47,51.)
[7] However valid the rationale for the domicile prerequisite may be in divorce actions, it does not apply to annulment
actions. In divorce actions. the applicable substantive law
changes as parties change their domicile, but in annulment
actions courts uniformly apply the law of the state in which
the marriage was contracted. (Colbert v. Colbert (1946) 28
CaI.2d 276, 280 [169 P.2d 633]; McDonald v. McDonald
(1936) 6 Cal.2d 457 [58 P.2d 163, 104 A.L.R. 1292]; Civ.
Code, § 63; see Storke, Annulment in the Conflict of Laws
(1959) 43 Minn.L.Rev. 849, 866.) Moreover, no jurisdictional
bar prevents defendant in this case from continuing to press
her claim for separa~ maintenance (see Goodwine v. Superior
Court (1965) 63 CaI.2d 481,483 [47 CaI.Rptr. 201, 407 P.2d
1]) and plaintiff may defend on the ground that ·no valid
marriage exists (see Hudson v. H'lldson (1959) 42 CaI.2d 735,
742 [344 P.2d 295] ; Dimon v. Dimon (1953) 40 Ca1.2d ,516,
537 [254 P.2d 528] ; DeYoung v. DeYoung (1946) 27 Ca1.2d
521, 528 [165 P.2d 457] ; Patterson v. Patterson (1947) 82
Cal.App.2d 838, 842-843 [187 P.2d 118]). We conclude, therefore, that the interests of the state of celebration of the marriage or the state of domicile of either party do not preclude a
court that has personal jurisdiction over both parties from
entert~ining an annulment action.
[8] It does not follow that because a court may exercise
that jurisdiction it must do so in all cases. In the present case
plaintiff was under a special disability in terms of access to
any forum other than California. 6 Moreover, defendant was
not caught inadvertently within California, and personal
jurisdiction was not exercised on a territorial power theory
but was obtained over defendant through her consent. Hence,
we -assume that no undue burdens are placed on her by the
trial of the action in California. In other annulment actions
where personal jurisdiction is the sole jurisdictional basis,
however, the doctrine of forum non conveniens might well be
invoked by one of the parties, or asserted by the court, to
cause a discretionary dismissal when fairness and the inter6Several states considering this disability have enacted legislation permitting servicemen to obtain divorce based on residence. See note 2 myra.
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ests of judicial administra.tion so demand. (See Developments
-Jurisdiction, supra, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 968.)
Plaintiff raises a procedural ground to preclude setting
aside the judgment. When defendant filed her motion to set
aside the default judgment and sought to file her cross-complaint for separate maintenance, plaintiff was outside of the
United States by reason of military orders. His attorney filed
a request for a stay of proceedings under the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. 7 That act provides that at
any stage of any proceeding in which a military person is
either plaintiff or defendant the court must on his application
stay the proceedings "unless, in the opinion of the court, the
ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant to
conduct his defense is not materially affected by his military
serviee." Plaintiff's attorney urged that because of his absence due to military service plaintiff could not assist him in
opposing defendant's efforts to set aside the default judgment
. or appear as a witness in such further hearings as might be
held and that the proceedings must therefore be stayed.
[9] When plaintiff's attorney requested a stay, a default
judgment ha.d been entered in favor of plaintiff, and defendant had asked to set it aside and also had requested separate
maintenance. Different considerations are involved in regard
to each of defendant's requests in ascertaining whether plaintiff's ability to prosecute his action is materially affected by
his military service. The grounds urged for setting aside the
default jUdgment, the only issue we reach today, were that it
was premature and that the California court was without
jurisdiction. Although we have upheld defendant's contentions as to the default judgment, we do not find that plaintiff's military service in any way interfered with his ability
to defend that judgment. The facts-dates of publication and
actual notice-were not in dispute and were a matter of firsthand knowledge to his attorney as well as to plaintiff. The
disputed question was one of law that plaintiff's attorney
could take charge of without plaintiff's presence. It is thereT" At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in
which a person in military service is involved, either as plaintiff or
defendant, during the period of such service or within sixty days thereafter may, in the discretion of the court in which it is pending, on its
own motion, and shall, on application to it by such person or some person
on his behalf, be stayed as provided in this Act unless, in the opinion of
the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant
to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military
service." (Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U .S.C.
App. 1521).)

)

)

fore our opinion that plaintiff's prosecution of the case at this
stage has not been "materially affected by reason of his military service." When the case is again before the trial court,
plaintiff can decide whether to proceed with his action for an
annulment. If defendant pursues her cross-complaint, plaintiif
can still request a stay. The trial court will then have an
opportunity to rule on the request.
The judgment is reversed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.

